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Antitrust Implications Arising from the Use of
Overly Broad Restrictive Covenants for
the Protection of Trade Secrets
Legal protection for trade secrets is essential to businesses and
industries that must communicate valuable information to employees
to ensure the efficient functioning of their enterprises. Absent legal
protection of this information from unwarranted use or disclosure, this
entrustment would not be economically possible1 because an employer
would be reluctant to disclose his valuable trade secret information to
an employee if the employee were free to appropriate the information
for his own use. Disclosure of trade secrets to employees does not
make employers vulnerable, however, because the law provides that
employees may not use or disclose trade secrets learned in the course
of employment without privilege to do so. Generally, this protection
of trade secrets exists in the absence of contract, but employers in
many industries require agreements to reinforce the protection as a
matter of course. If an improper use or disclosure of a trade secret
by a former employee occurs or is likely to occur, the owner of the
secret may sue the former employee to enjoin the use or disclosure
2
1. Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 578-79, 160 A.2d 430, 435 (1960).
2. Harris Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 157 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Ark. 1957); Arthur
Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 47, 105 N.E.2d
685, 705 (1952) (threatened irreparable harm to the employer-trade secret holder
will not be presumed but must be proven).
The injunction in some jurisdictions is perpetual, Elcor Chem, Corp. v. Agri-Sul,
Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204, 214 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), and in others is limited to the
amount of time it would take the defendant to discover the trade secret, Plant Indus.,
Inc. v. Coleman, 287 F. Supp. 636, 645 (C.D. Cal. 1968). Perpetual injunctions of
former employees have been criticized because they would give an employer the
power to eliminate a competitor from the market. See Kubik, Inc. v. Hull, 56 Mich.
App. 335, 364, 224 N.W.2d 80, 95 (1974).
For a discussion of when an injunction should be granted, see California Intelli-
gence Bureau v. Cunningham, 83 Cal. App. 2d 197, 188 P.2d 303 (2d Dist. 1948).
Equitable defenses including unclean hands are available to the defendant-em-
ployee. Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 1295-96 (5th Cir. 1970).
An employer seeking an injunction or recovery for the use or disclosure of a
trade secret must show a protectable trade secret that he owns, the existence of a
duty, or an express or implied agreement not to use or disclose the secret, and actual
or probable breach of the agreement. Frodge v. United States, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
583 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
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and in some cases may be awarded compensatory3 and punitive4
damages.
The protection given trade secrets impedes, to some extent, the
ability of employees to use their knowledge and skills in the market-
place. Such a restraint is justified to the extent that it affords legi-
timate trade secret protection. The danger exists, however, that
employees may be adversely and unjustly affected when employers
require broad nondisclosure covenants in employment contracts, which
result in extending the scope of the restraint to include information
that is not properly protectable.
This Note will address the problem of impermissible employee
restraints that result from compliance with overly broad covenants
designed to protect trade secrets. It will first review the information
that falls within the scope of trade secret protection and the basis for
and the methods of protection. The problem of overly broad con-
tractual provisions that restrain employees will then be examined with
a focus on the unevenness of current judicial treatment. Finally, the
author proposes that employees have a cause of action if they have
been harmed by compliance with impermissible restraints.
Definitional Aspects of Trade Secrets
Because many things can be considered trade secrets, an "exact
definition of a trade secret is not possible."5 The Restatement of Torts
attempts, however, to give flexible guidelines, including generic cate-
gories of items often considered trade secrets: "A trade secret may
consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information
which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity
to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."6
Trade secrets can be defined to include almost any category of infor-
mation. Virtually no type of information is inherently excluded from
3. Innersprings Inc. v. Joseph Aronauer, Inc., 128 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 338, 339
(E.D.N.Y. 1961). The cause of action for damages was recognized at common law,
but it is more common and usually more useful to attempt to enjoin disclosure than
to seek damages.
4. Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 1972), Components for Re-
search, Inc. v. Isolation Products, Inc., 241 Cal. App. 2d 726, 730, 50 Cal. Rptr. 829,
832 (1966).
Compare Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir.
1973) (theft of trade secrets not so exceptional as to permit award of punitive dam-
ages) with Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1971), re-
hearing denied, 459 F.2d 19 (discussion of punitive damages), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
892 (1972) (award of $175,000 punitive damages against former employee and sub-
sequent employer affirmed where there was a serious breach of loyalty found).
5. RESTATEmENT OF TORTs § 757, Comment b (1939).
6. Id.
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protection, 7 but what will be protected as a trade secret depends upon
the facts of each case.
8
Generally, what is a trade secret is narrowed by excluding infor-
mation that is not somewhat secret.9 Although absolute secrecy is
not required in the majority of jurisdictions, mere nondisclosure by the
holder will not render otherwise nonprotectable information a trade
secret.' 0 Further, no protection is given to information that is in the
public domain'1 or that is general knowledge in the trade, even though
not public knowledge. 12  Protection is generally granted, however, if
the holder has expended time, money, and effort to achieve develop-
ments, information, or results not known to others.'3
Although the holder must take reasonable measures to preserve
secrecy,14 the protection is not necessarily lost if the holder reveals
the secret to another who has an express or implied obligation not to
use or disclose it.15 Often the holder must divulge the secret to em-
7. Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972). In small companies,
for example, the information most frequently treated as trade secrets includes manu-
facturing processes, inventions developed in research, and customer lists. 1971 PATENT,
TRADE "K & COPYRIGHT Joura. (BNA) No. 57 at A-10, 11.
8. Knudsen Corp. v. Ever-Fresh Foods, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 241, 244 (C.D. Cal.
1971).
The scope of trade secret protection is flexible and evolves to reflect changing
technology, market conditions, and societal views. See J. McCARTHY, TR"mPAR BAn
UzN.uRA CoMIp-E' oN 18-19 (1973); Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete,
73 HARv. L. Rv. 625, 638, 667-68 (1960).
Although the rules respecting trade secret protection are certain, the application
of these rules is variable. The parameters of what information is covered as a trade
secret and whether some non-trade secret information is protectable are beyond the
scope of this Note. For a discussion of these problems, see 12 Business Organizations,
MUGrM, TRADE SEcants §§ 2.01-.09 (1977), Blake, Employee Agreements Not to
Compete, 73 H.uv. L. REv. 625, 651-74 (1960).
9. K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1974); Winston
Research Corp. v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 139, 144-45 (9th Cir.
1965); Digital Dev. Corp. v. Int'l Memory Sys., 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 136, 141 (S.D.
Cal. 1973); Fortna v. Martin, 158 Cal. App. 2d 634, 639, 323 P.2d 146, 149 (3d
Dist. 1958); By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 329
P.2d 147 (2d Dist. 1958); Data General Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc.,
175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 486, 488 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1972).
10. Fortna v. Martin, 158 Cal. App. 2d 634, 640, 323 P.2d 146, 149 (3d Dist.
1958).
11. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974).
12. National Chemsearch Corp. v. Schultz, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 218, 221 (N.D.
Ind. 1972). See generally REsTATmiENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958).
13. J & M Bldg. Specialties, Inc. v. Marwais Steel Co., 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
269, 270 (Cal. Super. Ct., Contra Costa Co. 1972).
14. K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1974); Lowndes
Prod., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 329, 191 S.E.2d 761, 765 (1972).
15. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974).
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ployees, licensees, and patent authorities so that it may be effectively
used.
Some information may be appropriate for protection both as a
trade secret and as a patent,16 but a process need not be patentable
to be a trade secret.17  The theories underlying the two types of pro-
tection, however, are different. A patent is a limited monopoly that
is given in exchange for eventual full disclosure of the information.'
On the other hand, a trade secret holder often has a natural monopoly
with an uncertain duration. This type of monopoly ends upon dis-
closure of the secret or upon its discovery by proper and independent
means. 19 As stated by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit:
[O]ne who makes or vends an article which is made by a secret
process or private formula cannot appeal to the protection of any
statute creating a monopoly in his product .... The process or
the formula is valuable only so long as he keeps it secret. The
public is free to discover it if it can by fair and honest means,
and, when discovered, anyone has the right to use it."
Both trade secrets and patents are "means to competitive advantage,"
and their value "lies in the rights they give to their owners for mono-
polistic exploitation."2' Although a patent owner "can make some-
thing which no one else can make because no one else is permitted"
16. Sinclair v. Aquarius Electronics, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 222, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 654, 658 (1974). Trade secret protection ceases with the grant of a patent.
Scharmer v. Carrollton Mfg. Co., 525 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1975).
17. Frodge v. United States, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 583, 587 (Ct. Cl. 1974). Al-
though the trade secret need not be novel in the patent sense, it must not be mere
everyday knowledge. Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C & P Plastics Inc., 340 F. Supp. 55,
74 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd, 506 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1975).
18. American Cyanamid Co. v. Power Conversion, Inc., 336 N.Y.S.2d 6, 10, 71
Misc. 2d 213 (1972).
19. The ownership of a trade secret "does not give the owner a monopoly in its
use, but merely a proprietary right which equity protects against usurpation by unfair
means." Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 583, 160 A.2d 430, 437 (1960).
There is no protection of trade secrets against discovery by "fair and honest means"
including "independent invention, accidental disclosure or .. . reverse engineering,
that is by starting with the known product and working backward to divine the
process ...... Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974), Uni-
versity Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 534 (5th Cir.
1974). The protection is only against "reprehensible means of learning another's
secret." RF-STATEMENT OF ToRTs § 757, Comment b (1939); Clark v. Bunker, 453
F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972).
Protection given trade secrets may last much longer than the 17 year patent term.
Protection remains so long as the secret is not duplicated by legitimate means. Uni-
versity Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 534 (5th Cir. 1974).
20. John D. Park and Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 29 (6th Cir. 1907), ap-
peal dismissed, 212 U.S. 588 (1908).
21. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct.
Cl. 1961).
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to do so, the owner of a trade secret frequently "can make something
which no one else can make because no one else knows how."
22
Legal Protection of Trade Secrets
Common Law Doctrine of Unfair Competition
The law of unfair competition provides "rules of combat" for use
in "trade warfare," 23 which have been characterized as a means of
externally controlling the "competitive excesses resulting from basic
human aggressions which competition 'channelizes."2 4  Practices that
contravene these rules are considered tortious methods of unfair com-
petition. They include, among others, defaming a competitor, dis-
paraging his goods or business methods, and taking trade secrets by
improper means. 25
The misuse of trade secrets by an employee may give rise to a
tort action for unfair competition against both the employee and the
recipient competitor. Whether the circumstances and nature of the
disclosure will in fact be held to be in excess of prescribed conduct
depends, however, upon what practices are considered unethical at
the time, because the concept of unfair competition is continually
evolving. In light of the current trend toward higher standards of
fairness and commercial morality,26 the employer's tort remedy under
the law of unfair competition might well be sufficient to restrain both
the disclosure of trade secrets by employees and the use of these
secrets by competitors. The remedy provided by the law of torts un-
der this doctrine is not the sole protection for holders of trade secrets.
Noncontractual Protection of Trade Secrets
Various theories have been advanced to provide legal protection
for trade secrets in the absence of express contractual provisions be-
tween employer and employeeY.2  Under one theory, disclosure of a
secret by an employee after the termination of the employment rela-
tionship constitutes a breach of the trust and confidence inherent in
the employer-employee relationship28 and violates the employee's
22. Id.
23. W. PRossEn, LAw OF TORTS 956 (4th ed. 1971).
24. 1 J. McCARTHY, Tr,,DnmqAmcs AND UNAM~ COMTPETTON 24 (1973).
25. W. PNossmi, LAw oF ToRTs 956-60 (4th ed. 1971).
26. See Protexol Corp. v. Koppers Co., 229 F.2d 635, 637 (2d Cir. 1956).
27. Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 165 Cal. 95, 130 P. 1180 (1913).
28. Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 288, 23 Cal. Rptr.
198, 210 (2d Dist. 1962). A basis for protection of trade secrets is that through
the confidential relationship the employee acquires knowledge he did not previously
have. The employment agreement is given weight in determining the existence of a
confidential relationship, but it is not conclusive. Wheelabrator Corp. v. Fogle, 317
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duty29 to the employer. Another theory has been advanced to the
effect that nonuse and nondisclosure are implied obligations or terms
of the employment relationship. 30 For this theory to apply the em-
ployee must be aware of the confidential nature of the information.
31
Finally, under some circumstances trade secrets have been considered
protected property interests, although reliance on a property theory
appears to be of diminishing importance.
32
Despite the trade secret protection afforded employers, an em-
ployee is free to use his skills, experience, and the general information
learned in employment for himself, even in competition with his for-
mer employer. 33 The ability of the employee to compete, however,
F. Supp. 633, 638 (W.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1971); Mono-
lith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d 288, 293
(9th Cir. 1969), A. H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Prods. Corp., 268 F. Supp. 289, 299
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968).
29. Witkop & Holmes Co. v. Boyce, 112 N.Y.S. 874, 878 (1908). See generally
Digital Dev. Corp. v. Int'l Memory Sys., 185 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 136 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
A higher duty covering nondisclosure of information in addition to trade secrets
can be found if the employee is a fiduciary. See generally Future Plastics, Inc. v.
Ware Shoals Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 1376 (D.S.C. 1972) (joint venture participants
owe fiduciary duty regarding trade secrets), Bancroft Whitney Co. v. Glen, 64 Cal.
2d 327, 49 Cal. Rptr. 825, 411 P.2d 921 (1966), Components for Research, Inc. v.
Isolation Prods., Inc., 241 Cal. App. 2d 726, 50 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1966); RESTATEMIENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958).
30. Water Servs. Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 171 (5th Cir. 1969);
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974), Winston Research Corp.
v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 140 (9th Cir. 1965), Plant Indus., Inc.
v. Coleman, 287 F. Supp. 636, 644 (C.D. Cal. 1968), By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cello-
phane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 329 P.2d 147 (2d Dist. 1958), Witkop &
Holmes Co. v. Boyce, 112 N.Y.S. 874, 878 (1908) (implied contract gave rise to the
duty).
31. Future Plastics, Inc. v. Ware Shoals Plastics, Inc. 340 F. Supp. 1376, 1384
(D.S.C. 1972). The employer-employee relationship is not sufficient to make all in-
formation confidential. The employee needs express or implied notice of the con-
fidential disclosure.
32. In By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 329
P.2d 147 (2d Dist. 1958), the court discussed the property theory but did not rely
on it exclusively. Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp., 407 F.2d 288, 293 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that California does not treat trade
secrets as property), Witkop & Holmes v. Boyce, 118 N.Y.S. 461, 464 (1909) (use
of the property and confidential relationship theories in conjunction).
E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917)
is often cited to support the proposition that trade secrets are not property, but see
the extensive discussion of the property theory in 12 Business Organizations, MILGRIM,
TRADE SECRETS §§ 1.01-.10 (1977).
Other general statements are made in support of protection including unjust
enrichment and inequitable conduct. E. W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408
F.2d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1969).
33. Future Plastics, Inc. v. Ware Shoals Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 1376, 1384
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is limited by the requirement that such competition be undertaken
fairly34 without appropriation of trade secrets.
In Telex v. International Business Machines Corp.,35 the trial
court found theft of trade secrets in Telex's hiring of IBM employees.
The court outlined the extent of the information a former IBM em-
ployee could properly use while working for Telex in competition with
IBM. The employee could carry with him and use his general knowl-
edge of IBM's products, including markets and marketing problems
and "even limited general notes of information or opinions respecting
the fields of his employment which he had made as a part of his work
experience . ... 36 To capitalize and exploit confidential IBM docu-
ments and studies themselves, however, was improper.3 7  Thus, under
Telex, employees changing jobs even within the same industry may
use the information and skills acquired in their original employment
that enable them to continue to work effectively. Despite the guide-
lines in Telex, an employee, even one not bound by a contract pro-
vision, is not free to disclose his former employer's trade secrets to a
new employer.
Contractual Protection of Trade Secrets
Because some employers find that trade secrets are becoming
increasingly difficult to protect,38 many attempt to buttress the legally
(D.S.C. 1972), Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 259 (E.D. La.
1967), Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 262 (S.D. Cal.
1958), aff'd mem., 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961),
Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Mosely, 24 Cal. 2d 104, 113, 148 P.2d 9 (1944).
When an injunction is granted, it will be fashioned to permit an employee to use
his skills. By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 329
P.2d 147 (2d Dist. 1958). It is unclear whether some confidential information that
is not a trade secret is also protected by virtue of the employment relationship. An
employee may freely use much of the information he discovers or learns during his
employment, and it is improper to attempt to restrict that use. See notes 68-69 &
accompanying text infra.
34. Knudsen Corp. v. Ever-Fresh Foods, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 241, 247 (C.D. Cal.
1971), Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 262 (S.D. Cal.
1958), aff'd mere., 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961).
Means of unfair competition involving trade secrets include use of secrets with
the intent to injure the employer in addition to unwarranted use and disclosure. Gloria
Ice Cream & Milk Co. v. Cowan, 2 Cal. 2d 460, 41 P.2d 340 (1935), California Intel-
ligence Bureau v. Cunningham, 83 Cal. App. 2d 197, 188 P.2d 303 (2d Dist. 1948).
35. 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894
(10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
36. Id. at 315.
37. Id.
38. This diculty is attributed to, one, the mounting cost and difficulty of litiga-
tion, two, the rise in mobility of employees, and three, the decline in a sense of
implied protection by the use of contractual provisions3" that explicitly
delimit what employees are permitted to do after the employment re-
lationship terminates. The contractual provisions are normally in the
form of covenants not to compete or nondisclosure covenants.
In many jurisdictions the use of a covenant not to compete, an-
cillary to an employment contract, 40 is considered an effective method
of protecting trade secrets. 41  This type of covenant generally provides
that after termination of employment, the employee will not engage
in competition with the former employer, either on his own or by
working for a competitor. The covenant is usually accompanied by
geographic restrictions and a specified time limit. Because this type
of provision limits competition, it is an effective means of ensuring that
nothing learned in the employment relationship may be used to the
employer's competitive detriment. In some jurisdictions, however, a
covenant not to compete is unenforceable unless it is specifically de-
signed to prevent unfair competition by protecting trade secrets or
confidential information.
42
At common law, such post-employment employee restraints were
presumptively void because of the possibility of the loss of one's ability
to earn a living, the concomitant loss to society, and the possible use
of such covenants as a means of monopolizing. 43 In jurisdictions that
allow covenants not to compete, the influence of the common law is
seen in the covenants' being viewed with disfavor because they restrain
trade by restricting the ability of an employee to engage in his oc-
cupation. As a result, the employer seeking enforcement bears the
burden of demonstrating the covenants' reasonableness. 44  Reason-
ableness is determined by an examination of all of the facts and cir-
cumstances, including, but not limited to, the nature of the temporal
and geographic restraints.45
corporate loyalty. 1971 PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT JOUR. (BNA) No. 57 at
A-10, 11.
39. 12 Business Organizations, MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 3.02 (1977). Other
measures in addition to contractual provisions include extensive pre-employment screen-
ing and exit interviews. 1971 PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT JouR. (BNA) No. 57
at A-10, 11.
40. Different rules apply to covenants not to compete that are not ancillary to
employment contracts. See 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1379-84 (1962).
41. Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 685-86 (Tex. 1973).
42. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Weaver, 257 Ark. 926, 929-30, 521 S.W.2d 69, 71
(1975), Mixing Equip. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 436 F.2d 1308, 1312 (3d Cir.
1971).
43. Mitchell v. Reynolds, I P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711), Blake,
Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HAav. L. REv. 625, 629 (1960).
44. Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d 685,
693 (1952).
45. id.
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Generally the reasonableness of a covenant will be determined
by balancing the interests of the employer, the employee, and the
public. The restriction will be enforced only if it is "no greater than
necessary to protect the employer in some legitimate interest . . .
not unduly harsh and oppressive on the employee . . . [and] not
injurious to the public."46 This balancing process involves confficting
policies including the employer's interest in protecting his business
and secrets, the employee's inherent right to earn a living by using
his skill and talent, and the public interest in the promotion of research
and "encouragement of competition and the discouragement of
monopoly."
47
Covenants not to compete seem to be illegal in California48 under
Section 16600 of the California Business and Professions Code, which
provides that covenants that restrain post-employment competition are
void. The section states that, with certain exceptions, "every contract
by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession,
trade or business of any kind is to that extent void."49  Covenants
restraining future employment must be distinguished from covenants
involving customer lists in which the employee's knowledge regarding
customers was gained from the employer. Solicitation using the cus-
tomer list of a former employer is considered disclosure of a trade
secret and can be enjoined in California courts. 50
Although California appears to reject covenants not to compete
as illegal restraints on future employment, it does allow contractual
protection of trade secrets by nondisclosure covenants. A nondis-
46. Id. at 28, 105 N.E.2d at 691-92, DeLong Corp. v. Lucas, 176 F. Supp. 104,
121 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1960).
47. Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 28, 105 N.E.2d
685, 692 (1952).
48. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 141
(9th Cir. 1965), Fortna v. Martin, 158 Cal. App. 2d 634, 323 P.2d 146 (1958),
Morris v. Harris, 127 Cal. App. 2d 476, 274 P.2d 22 (1954).
49. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1964). The exceptions are found
in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16601-02 (West 1964).
Contracts providing for nonuse and nondisclosure of trade secrets are not void under
this section. Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 239, 398 P.2d 147,
42 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1965).
Six other states have statutes prohibiting contracts that restrain a person from
engaging in a lawful business, profession, or trade: Alabama, Florida, Michigan,
Montana, North Dakota, and Oklahoma. 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ff 1835 at 2935.
Section 16600 has been used to invalidate contracts in which trade secrets have
not been involved. Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 239, 398 P.2d
147, 42 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1965), Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1st Dist. 1971).
50. Gordon v. Landau, 49 Cal. 2d 690, 321 P.2d 456 (1958), Ingrassia v. Bailey,
172 Cal. App. 2d 117, 341 P.2d 370 (1959).
closure covenant generally provides that an employee will not use or
disclose trade secrets after the termination of employment. The cove-
nant is recognized as an independent means for protecting trade secrets
in states that do not recognize the covenant not to compete as a means
of protecting trade secrets and also is often used as a common com-
panion provision to a covenant not to compete in states in which it
is recognized. The nondisclosure covenant, like the covenant not to
compete, is subject to judicial requirements of reasonableness. 51
Overly Broad Covenants
Both covenants not to compete and nondisclosure covenants can
be drafted to restrain employees to a greater extent than is legally
permissible. As a condition of employment, an employer may require
the employee's assent to a covenant to protect trade secrets that is
overly broad. Usually the employee has no bargaining power with
respect either to the covenant's inclusion or to the terms of the agree-
ment. He will accede if he wants the job.52
Because determining what constitutes a trade secret is difficult
and subject to a vague standard, there is always the danger of over-
breadth in the drafting of a nondisclosure covenant. The employer
who is unsure of the scope of proper protection may in good faith err
on the side of overinclusiveness in an attempt to ensure protection of
trade secrets. Because the employee may use general knowledge
learned during his employment after he leaves, a provision that the
employee must "keep confidential all information" 3 he has learned
as a result of his employment is per se overly broad. The employer by
seeking to include information not properly within the scope of the
protection afforded by the law of unfair competition may have acted
in a way that will have an anticompetitive effect. Thus, an attempt
to extend protection to all business information learned is injurious in
two respects: it is both an abuse of the unfair competition protection
for trade secrets and an impermissible restraint on the employee who
complies with it.
The overly broad and impermissible covenant may harm the em-
ployee. If he leaves his employer and works in a related industry or
field, he cannot totally comply with a provision proscribing the use of
all information acquired because he cannot "wipe clean the slate of
51. By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 164, 329
P.2d 147 (2d Dist. 1958).
52. See Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Hxav. L. REV. 625,
661, 683 (1960).
53. See, e.g., B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 500, 192
N.E.2d 99, 105 (1963).
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his memory."5 4  Further, the existence of such a provision may make
the employee less attractive to a potential employer who wishes neither
to become the object of litigation if the former employer seeks to en-
force the covenant nor to be frustrated by employee refusals to use
and disclose information that is not in fact a trade secret. The em-
ployee may consider himself to be bound by the covenant so that in
seeking a new employer he has diminished bargaining power.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co.55
discussed the effects on employees of restrictions on the use and dis-
closure of trade secrets. The restrictions were said to "limit the em-
ployee's employment opportunities, tie him to a particular employer,
and weaken his bargaining power with that employer. [They] inter-
fere with the employee's movement to the job in which he may most
effectively use his skills."56  According to the court, overly broad
restrictions also affect competition and harm the public because
[t]hey inhibit an employee from either setting up his own business
or from adding his strength to a competitor of his employer, and
thus they diminish potential competition. Such restrictions im-
pede the dissemination of ideas and skills throughout industry.
The burdens which they impose upon the employee and society
increase in proportion to the significance of the employee's accom-
plishments, and the degree of his specialization.5 7
An employer's motives in requiring a contract can reach beyond
protection for his trade secrets. The court in Arthur Murray Dance
Studios v. Witter" indicated that in determining the reasonableness
of a covenant not to compete a proper factor to consider is the possible
"real objects" of the employer, which can include the desire
to remove a competitor and ordinary competition .. .to prevent
the employee from quitting, or to suppress or discipline him ...
to cause the employee to withdraw from all business .. .[or] to
prevent [an] employee from using the skill and intelligence ac-
quired or increased through experience or instruction received in
course of work for [the] employer.59
As one court summarized, "[T]he protection allowed trade secrets
'is not a sword to be used by employers to retain employees by the
54. Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 288, 23 Cal. Rptr.
198, 210 (2d Dist. 1962), Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp.
250, 262 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd mem., 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 869 (1961).
55. 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965).
56. Id. at 137.
57. Id. at 137-38. See also Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 579, 160 A.2d
430, 435 (1960).
58. 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d 685 (1952).
59. Id. at 33, 105 N.E.2d at 695-96.
threat of rendering them substantially unemployable in the field of
their experience should they desire to resign.'-60
If a covenant is overly broad, the employer has stepped beyond
the privilege for protection of trade secrets that the law of unfair com-
petition recognizes. He has imposed an impermissible restriction on
the employee bound by the covenant whose compliance thereby may
also injure the public.
Judicial Treatment of Overly Broad Covenants
An overly broad covenant will reach a court in two ways. An
employee or his new employer advised of the overbreadth and desirous
of using nonprotectable information covered by the overly broad cov-
enant may seek a declaratory judgment to limit the covenant.61 More
commonly, however, a former employer will attempt to enjoin dis-
closure by the employee and the use by him and his new employer of
trade information that is ostensibly protected.
Faced with a covenant not to disclose or a covenant not to com-
pete, a court will not enforce provisions of that covenant that are overly
broad. Depending upon the facts of the case and the jurisdiction
involved the court will either void the covenant, sever the offend-
ing portions and enforce the remainder, or enforce the covenant only
to the extent reasonable under the circumstances. 62 Although at
one time there was a presumption that all covenants not to com-
pete were invalid,63 today most overly broad covenants are subject
either to severence or enforcement to the extent reasonable under the
circumstances.
64
If there has been an improper employee restraint by use of a
covenant drafted only in part to protect trade secrets, none of these
alternatives is satisfactory. Inequities necessarily result to the em-
ployee who complies with the overly broad covenant, and there is no
penalty imposed on the employer who has used them. Therefore,
although the employer has a compensatory remedy for the employee's
disclosure of protectable information, the employee who is restrained
improperly under an overly broad covenant has no comparable remedy.
60. Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
614, 622 (D. Ariz. 1973), quoting E. W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d
1108, 1112-13 (8th Cir. 1969).
61. E.g., Miller v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 339 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D. Wis. 1971),
Herskovitz v. Todd Co., 85 N.Y.S.2d 707 (Sup. Ct., 1949).
62. This method is sometimes called partial enforcement and does not depend
upon the divisibility of the restraint.
63. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HAIv. L. REv. 625, 629
(1960). See note 43 & accompanying text supra.
64. Id. at 681-82.
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Judicial treatment that voids the impermissible restraint, severs these
provisions, or only enforces the offensive provisions to the extent rea-
sonable under the circumstances does not afford compensation to the
employee for any harm suffered.
Voiding a covenant not to compete that is overly broad will not
deter employers from drafting such covenants. A covenant not to
compete may be voided with the result that the employee is free to
compete with his former employer, but the implied in law protec-
tion of the employer's trade secret remains. 65 The result is that an
employer may lose the assurance of no competition from a former
employee, but protection against use and disclosure of trade secrets
is not lost.
The second method of dealing with overbreadth in covenants not
to compete and nondisclosure covenants is severance, which allows
the overly broad provisions of the covenant to be disregarded and the
remainder enforced. As in voiding, this sanction is insufficient to
deter employers from drafting overly broad provisions to restrain their
employees. When severence is used,
the divisibility of a promise in excessive restraint of trade is de-
termined by purely mechanical means: if the promise is so
worded that the excessive restraint can be eliminated by crossing
out a few of the words with a "blue pencil," while at the same
time the remaining words constitute a complete and valid con-
tract, the contract as thus "blue-pencilled" will be enforced.
66
The use of severence as a method of treating overly broad covenants
presents problems in that differences in draftsmanship can lead to
uneven results and in that the method does not consider degrees of
reasonableness.
The third method of judicial treatment of overly broad covenants
is enforcement to the extent reasonable under the circumstances.
67
This method ignores drafting variables and provides for enforcement
only of the permissible provisions. An injunction sought by an em-
ployer will be granted but will be framed to provide protection only
65. The Restatement of Contracts advocates voiding a covenant if it is deter-
mined that the employer made the covenant with the intention of monopolizing:
a promise involving an unreasonable restraint and not divisible is "not enforceable
even for so much of the performance as would be a reasonable restraint." RE-sTATE-
wENT oF CoNTsAcTs § 518 (1932).
66. 6A A. CoRniN, CoNTRAcTs § 1390 (1962).
67. E.g., Kofoed Pub. Relations Assoc., Inc. v. Mullins, 257 So. 2d 603, 605
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). The court held an overly broad covenant not to com-
pete should be enforced to the extent reasonable. To do otherwise would impose too
great a duty of foresight and would deprive the parties of their rights to make re-
strictions on personal competition.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
of those interests that the court considers proper. To determine the
scope of protection, a court will balance the interests of the employer,
the employee, and the public. In Futurecraft v. Clary,68 a California
court of appeal outlined the balancing process in which it engages in
shaping protection:
Protection should be afforded when, and only when, the informa-
tion in question has value in the sense that it affords the [ex-
employer] a competitive advantage over competitors who do not
know of [the trade secret], and where the granting such protec-
tion will not unduly hamstring the ex-employee in the practice
of his occupation or profession. This simple balancing process
will invariably protect all of the pertinent interests - those of the
former employer, of the former employee, and of the public.69
Although a court will not enforce provisions of an overly broad
covenant that constitute an employer's attempt to extend trade secret
protection too far, an employee who does not know of the overbreadth
may nevertheless attempt to comply with the provisions of the cov-
enant. To the extent that his compliance with the covenant acts to
his detriment in the competitive marketplace and to the detriment of
the public in restricting his services and in having a monopolizing
effect, there is an impermissible restraint of trade. Harm will continue
until the covenant is terminated by deliberate noncompliance or by
judicial tailoring.
The effect of either method, severance or enforcement to the ex-
tent reasonable, is that trade secrets will be protected despite the use
of overly broad covenants that can restrain employees and inhibit
competition. The dangers to employees that inhere in these ap-
proaches have been emphasized:
For every covenant that finds its way to court, there are thousands
which exercise an in terrorem effect on employees who respect
their contractual obligations and on competitors who fear legal
complications if they employ a covenantor .... [T]he mobility
of untold numbers of employees is restricted by the intimidation
of restrictions whose severity no court would sanction. If sever-
ance is generally applied, employers can fashion truly ominous
covenants with confidence that they will be pared down and en-
forced when the facts of a particular case are not unreasonable.-0
68. 205 Cal. App. 279, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1962).
69. Id. at 288, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 211 (quoting von Kalinowski, Key Employees
and Trade Secrets, 47 VA. L. REv. 583, 599 (1961) (emphasis in original)).
For a discussion of competing policies, see Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 579,
160 A.2d 430, 435 (1960).
70. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REv. 625, 682-83
(1960); see Richard P. Rita Personnel Serv. Int'l, Inc. v. Kot, 229 Ga. 314, 191 S.E.2d
79 (1972).
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Application of the Antitrust Laws to Overly Broad
Restrictive Covenants
Restrictive covenants in employment agreements can be used
by employers as a device to inhibit the free flow of information and
employee services, but the employer who uses covenants for this pur-
pose is rarely penalized. This anomalous result is seen by examining
the effect of judicial partial enforcement of overly broad covenants
whereby the employer is left free to draft overly broad covenants with
the assurance that his trade secrets will remain protected. At worst,
proscribed provisions will be voided or severed. The repeated use of
these types of overly broad covenants, to the extent that employees
respect them, may restrain trade and lead to the employer's establish-
ment or maintenance of a substantial position in the market to the
detriment of employees, competitors, and the public. The author
proposes that there is a currently existing penalty that would tend to
remove the economic advantage and incentive for employers to engage
in this type of act and that should be used to deter employers from
using overly broad covenants.
Theoretically, section 1 of the Sherman Act 7' is available to em-
ployees who have been restrained and harmed by the use of either
overly broad covenants not to compete or overly broad nondisclosure
covenants. In practice, however, affirmative use of the Sherman
Act has been unsuccessful in actions by employees to invalidate re-
straints, and its use as a defense to an action to protect trade secrets
has been blocked.on procedural grounds.72 The remainder of this
Note will review attempts that have made use of the Sherman Act
defensively to defeat such covenants and will consider proposed af-
firmative use of that Act by employees injured as a result of compliance
with overly broad covenants.
Antitrust Claims Raised as a Defense
Attempts by employees to raise antitrust violations as defenses
in suits by employers to enjoin use and disclosure of trade secrets have
met with little success. 73 A court may be presented with the defense
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). The discussion of antitrust remedies will be limited
to § 1.
72. Telephone Answering Serv., Inc. v. Johnston, 1968 Trade Cases (CCH) I[
72,607 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Allegheny Co. Jan. 5, 1968). See generally Blake, Employee
Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HAIv. L. REv. 625, 628 n.8 (1960), Goldschmid,
Antitrust's Neglected Stepchild: A Proposal for Dealing with Restrictive Covenants
Under Federal Law, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 1193 (1973), Note, Employee Nondisclosure
Covenants and Federal Antitrust Law, 71 CoLum. L. RE:v. 417 (1971).
73. See generally El Salto, S. A. v. PSG Co., 444 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1971),
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that antitrust violations have been committed that constitute unclean
hands, which will preclude injunctive relief. The court may find
either that the activity alleged as a defense is insufficiently related
to the subject of the suit to permit the use of the unclean hands de-
fense or that even if the relationship is present, denying the trade
secret holder protection would be inequitable.
Glass Laboratories, Inc. v. Crystal74 illustrates the reluctance of
the courts to recognize antitrust defenses. In that case the employer
sued in a state court to enjoin the employee's use of trade secrets and
to recover compensatory and punitive damages. In addition to deny-
ing the plaintiff's allegations, the employee asserted that the employer
had engaged in acts constituting unclean hands, including participating
in illegal patent pools and conspiring to monopolize, to fix prices, and
to allocate customers and markets. The court found that it had no
jurisdiction to hear the antitrust issues75 and stated in dictum that,
even if there were jurisdiction, the activity alleged as evidence of
unclean hands was not sufficiently connected with the matter in liti-
gation. Further, notwithstanding a possible finding of antitrust vio-
lations, "equity would not give competitors free reign to damage
plaintiff's legitimate property interests" 7 6 by eliminating trade secret
protection.
In a case in which the plaintiff establishes an interrelation between
the employer's suit and the antitrust defense, such a showing will not
necessarily permit the antitrust defense. In Telegraph Answering
Service, Inc. v. Johnston,77 the defendant showed the necessary in-
terrelation, but the court still rejected the defense. There, the cov-
enants not to compete that the employer was seeking to enforce against
former employees were devices used to monopolize the market. De-
spite the demonstrated connection between the alleged claim and the
defense raised, the court held that the antitrust defense was not cog-
nizable in that equity action, stating, "The substance and intent of
our ruling is the exclusion of antitrust defenses . . . ."7 Therefore,
even in instances in which the nexus between the employer's claims
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971) "[T]he circumstances in which an alleged antitrust
violation may become a defense in a private contract action are narrowly circum-
scribed." Id. at 482.
74. 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 647 (N.J. Super. Ct., Bergen Co. 1970).
75. The court distinguished reliance exclusively on alleged antitrust violations
from an allegation that also involved conduct prohibited by common law restraints
of trade. Id. at 648. See also TNT Communications, Inc. v. Management Television
Sys., Inc., 1968 TRADE CASES (CCH) ff 72,653 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (antitrust counter-
claim dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).
76. Id. at 649.
77. 1968 TRADE CASES (CCH) ff 72,607 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Allegheny Co. 1968).
78. Id. at ff 86,142.
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and the employee's defenses based on antitrust violations is alleged,
courts may treat such defenses very restrictively: 79  "[A] Sherman
Act violation is not an affirmative defense to a contract suit, even
where the violation is inherent in the contract sued upon, so long as
judicial enforcement of the contract would not be enforcing the precise
conduct made unlawful by the Act."80
As illustrated, the problem of equitable defenses has precluded
the use of the antitrust laws as defensive measures in suits brought
by employers to protect their trade secrets. If the employee sues
affirmatively for harm suffered as a result of attempted improper
extension of contractual protection, however, problems peculiar to
defenses would not be present.
Affirmative Use of Antitrust Remedies by the Employee
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, com-
bination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal . "..."81 This section prohibits "those classes
of contracts . . . which the common law had deemed to be undue
restraints of trade."182  The effect of section 1 was to "adopt the com-
mon-law proscription of all 'contracts or acts which . . . [have] a
monopolistic tendency . . . and which interfere with the natural flow'
of an appreciable amount of interstate commerce."83
Because some relationships have a "'pernicious effect on compe-
tition and lack . . . any redeeming virtue,' [they] are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and thus constitute per se violations of
the Act."84 Most contracts, however, violate the Act only if they are
found to be actually "unreasonable." Covenants not to compete that
are ancillary to employment contracts are subject to the rule of rea-
son.85  Courts have held that the combination or contract to restrain
trade can occur even if only one party is benefited 86 and that agree-
79. El Salto, S. A. v. PSG Co., 444 F.2d 477 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940
(1971).
80. Id. at 482 (citing Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 519-20 (1958)). See gen-
erally Telex Corp. v. International Bus. Mach., Inc., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975),
rev'g on other grnds, 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973) (unclean hands alleged).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
82. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959).
83. Id., quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
84. Frackowiak v. Farmers Ins. Co., 411 F. Supp. 1309, 1317 (D. Kan. 1976).
85. Sound Ship Bldg. Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 387 F. Supp. 252 (D.N.J.
1975), aff'd, 533 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1976), Alders v. AFA Corp., 353 F. Supp. 654
(S.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd mem., 490 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally Trixler
Brokerage Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 505 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1974).
86. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), United States v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
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ments not to compete, although otherwise lawful, can be used for
the purpose of restraining trade or extending a preexisting monopoly.
87
The loss of employment opportunity because of antitrust law violations
can provide a basis for recovery of damages. 88  Thus, overly broad
covenants that are unreasonable and that restrain trade can violate
section 1 of the Sherman Act. The employee who suffers damage
from compliance may have an antitrust remedy.
To date, courts have been reluctant to find violations of section
1 of the Sherman Act when presented with covenants alleged to be
unreasonable restraints. In Alders v. AFA Corp. of Florida,89 an em-
ployment agreement containing a covenant not to compete for five
years was executed as an incident to a purchase of one corporation
by another. An employee sued to enjoin its enforcement and for a
declaratory judgment that the provision was invalid under the Sherman
Act. The court initially rejected the employer's attempt to assert an
in pari delicto defense, holding that in addition to being disfavored
in private antitrust actions, the defense was inapplicable in the case
because of the employee's noninvolvement in drafting the covenant.
The court held, however, that insufficient evidence had been submitted
at the trial to meet the employee's burden of proving illegality under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Despite a finding of overbreadth with
respect to the geographic restrictions in the covenant, the court, noting
the intense competition in the industry and the small market share of
the defendant, held that there was no unreasonable restraint and no
violation of the Sherman Act.90
Failure to show a restraint that was "so substantial as to affect
either market prices or commercial freedom" resulted in the dismissal
of the employee's action in Miller v. Kimberly-Clark Corp."' The
employee had entered into an agreement restricting his "right to dis-
close 'information or knowledge' which was not 'generally known' [and
which had been] acquired while he was employed at Kimberly-
Clark."92  He demanded a declaration that the covenant was invalid
and unenforceable and, using the antitrust laws, sought to restrain its
enforcement. The court disposed of the first claim, which did not
87. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 119 (1948).
It has been recognized that an employer's requiring an overly broad covenant
not to compete can constitute an overt act as part of a scheme to monopolize in vio-
lation of §§ 1 & 2 of the Sherman Act. Sar Industries, Inc. v. Monogram Industries,
Inc., 1976-1 TRADE CASES (CCH) f[ 60,816 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
88. Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1967).
89. 353 F. Supp. 654 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd men., 490 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1974).
90. Id. at 656. See generally Parisian Live Dyers & Cleaners v. Springfield, 275
S.W. 1098 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1925).
91. 339 F. Supp. 1296, 1298 (E. D. Wis. 1971).
92. Id. at 1296-97.
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rely on the antitrust laws, by finding a lack of diversity jurisdiction
and by holding that the suit involved a "local contract dispute" and
not a federal question.93 The second claim, based on the antitrust
laws, was also found jurisdictionally insufficient because the contract
did not constitute a public injury.9 4
Although courts have not been presented with cases in which
public injury has been proven, facts demonstrating the existence of
numerous unreasonably restrictive employee covenants having the
cumulative effect of extending the employer's share of the market
may result in a finding that section 1 of the Sherman Act has been
violated.9 5 Although employees have been unsuccessful in using
the Sherman Act offensively against employers who have used overly
broad nondisclosure covenants or covenants not to compete to restrain
their employees, the courts appear to indicate that, upon a proper
showing of an unreasonable restraint of trade, the employee would
have a viable remedy.
Employers' attempts to bind employees to them and restrict the
flow of information to the public and to competitors have a market
effect analogous to "no-switching" agreements, in which employers
agree not to hire one another's employees. 96 In each case the em-
ployees' services are effectively kept from public distribution by limit-
ing them to one employer. Such agreements work to the disadvantage
of new industries that need employees and thereby tend to have an
anticompetitive effect.
93. Id. at 1297.
94. Id. at 1298. Cf. Frackowiak v. Farmers Ins. Co., 411 F. Supp. 1309, 1314
(D. Kan. 1976).
95. See generally By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d
157, 329 P.2d 147 (2d Dist. 1958), in which an injunction granted in response to a
claim of misappropriation of trade secrets was held to be so broad as to be a restraint
of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act and of the Cartwright Act, Cali-
fornia's antitrust statute. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-58 (West 1964). The
injunction prevented the employee from using any machine similar to one made by
the plaintiff even if the machine was made without any unfair competition. The
court held that the employer was only entitled to a decree to protect against wrongful
use of its trade secrets. A motive that is not consonant with intention to monopolize
will not save the defendant if unreasonableness can be shown. "Under the Sherman
Act the test of validity for any restraint of trade is not the motive of the parties who
act in concert. Restraints of trade must be examined not merely for the intent of
their creators but for their reasonableness . . . and therefore they must be considered
in the light of their impact upon the competitive structure of the industry affected."
Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652, 656 (2d Cir. 1957) (citation omitted).
96. The motives in each instance, however, are different. The object of a no-
switching agreement is generally to freeze current market shares by the use of a col-
laborative effort. The overly broad covenant is a unilateral act which can restrain
trade and result in an increased market share for the employer.
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In Nichols v. Spencer International Press, Inc.,97 an employee af-
fected by an agreement not to employ him sued, alleging antitrust
violations. The court stated that
[although] the antitrust laws were not enacted for the purpose
of preserving freedom in the labor market, nor of regulating em-
ployment practices as such . . . agreements among supposed
competitors not to employ each other's employees not only restrict
freedom to enter into employment relationships, but may also,
depending upon the circumstances, impair full and free competi-
tion in the supply of a service or commodity to the public. 9
Consequently, the court held that such a finding constitutes an anti-
trust violation.
In Union Circulation Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,99 agree-
ments not to hire employees of a competitor were found to be an
unreasonable restraint of trade and a Sherman Act violation because
the agreements were harmful to competition. The court held that
the existence of such agreements has a probable result of freezing the
labor supply because an employee will "hesitate to leave his employer
in order to join a newly formed competitor, or an expanding established
one . . "100 The court concluded that the tendency of the agree-
ments to inhibit labor mobility works to the advantage of the estab-
lished organizations and to the disadvantage of the newer ones.
The effect of the no-switching agreements on the market is similar
to that of overly broad restrictive covenants. In the first instance,
an employee will find it difficult to leave his employer because only
nonparties to the no-switching agreement will hire him. If there is a
broad restrictive covenant, however, not only will employers generally
hesitate to hire an employee who is a party to such an agreement, but
also an employee will feel unable to work for any competitor in the
same industry. The no-switching agreement permits employee mo-
bility insofar as there are employers not party to the agreement who
will hire employees. An employee attempting to comply with an
overly broad restrictive covenant, however, may believe he can work
for no competitor in the same industry. In both instances, employee
mobility is impaired, and there is a potential anticompetitive effect in
the industry. The overly broad covenant can have an even greater
effect on competition than a no-switching agreement. If use of the
no-switching agreement will support finding an antitrust violation, the
use of an overly broad restrictive covenant with an anticompetitive
effect should also be considered an antitrust violation.
97. 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967).
98. Id. at 335-36.
99. 241 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1957).
100. Id. at 658.
[Vol. 29
November 1977] RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND TRADE SECRETS 317
Conclusion
The effect of overly broad post-employment restraints can be
restraint of trade. Employee compliance with such restraints may
prevent the free flow of information and employee services to the
detriment of employees, competition, and the public. Despite the
continued existence of these overly broad restraints, employers to
date have not been subjected to any sanction except court ordered
nonenforcement of the provisions that are overly broad.
Although the defensive use of the antitrust laws by employees in
suits by employers to enforce trade secret rights appears to be fraught
with procedural difficulties, the employee has a remedy in the affirma-
tive use of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The employee whose em-
ployment opportunities are adversely affected because of an overly
broad restrictive covenant is not precluded from suing the employer
despite the employee's acceptance of the covenant as a term of
employment.
The major hurdle in suits by employees under the federal anti-
trust laws involving overly broad covenants has been making a satis-
factory factual showing of an unreasonable restraint of trade as a result
of the covenants. The burden could be met, however, by demonstrat-
ing the cumulative effect of overly broad covenants in wide use in
a particular industry. Despite the problems of proof involved, the
use of section 1 of the Sherman Act is a viable remedy for employees
who have been injured by the existence of overly broad restrictive
covenants.
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